A review of game theoretic and social psychological models of coalition formation / BEBR No. 372 by Murnighan, John Keith

UNIVERSITV OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA CHAiVlPAIGN
BOOKS TACKS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/reviewofgametheo372murn
Faculty Working Papers
A REVIEW OF GAME THEORETIC AND SOCIAL
'PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS OF COALITION FORMATION
J. Keith Mumlghan
#372
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commd^e and Business Aladnistratlon
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
February 11, 1977
A REVIEW OF GAME THEORETIC AND SOCIAL
'PSYCHOLOGICAL MCDELS OF COALITION FORMATION
J. Keith Mumighan
#372
.1- * .
.
- ^
••
.1? ' f 1
) ^O^iSHT '-.•.'
A REVIEW OF GAME THEORETIC
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS
OF COALITION FORMATION
J. Keith Murnighan
Assistant Professor
Organizational Behavior Group
Department of Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Charapaign

A Review of Game Theoretic
and Social Psychological Models
of Coalition Formation
Abstract
This paper reviews three classes of game theoretic solution concepts
(solutions, subsolutions, and the core, bargaining set models, and the Shapley
value) and four social psychological models (Minimum Resource theory. Minimum
Power theory. Bargaining theory, and the Weighted Probability model) of coalition
formation. The research that has been conducted on characteristic function games
and on coalition situations involving more than three players has been summarized
and the models have been evaluated. The advantages of collaboration between the
two disparate but similar areas are discussed.

Formal theory concerning coalition behavior has been studied by game
theorists since 1944 (von Neumani\ and Morgenstern) and by social psychologists
since 1956 (Caplow) . The two areas have adopted different philosophical
approaches and have made limited progress in their relatively independent'
pursuits of knowledge. Game theorists have developed elaborate and elegant
mathematics (i.e., normative theory) but have paid little attention to the
applicability of their results to human behavior. Social psychologists, on
the other hand, have collected a large amount of data on three-person groups,
but have only recently expanded their descriptive models in attempts to pre-
dict bargaining behavior in larger, more complicated conflict situations.
This paper sumnarizes selected portions of the research and theory from the
two areas and attempts to locate the common group between them. A concerted
effort bridging the two areas holds increased promise for breakthroughs which
each field alone might find unattainable.
This paper limits its review to aspects of the two areas that are most
similar and that, therefore, have the greatest collaborative potential.
Extensive reviews of the game theory literature can be found in Luce and Raiffa
(1957) or Rapoport (1970). Reviews of earlier social psychological research
can be found in Chertkoff (1970) or Stryker (1972) . Present coverage of game
theoretic models is restricted to characteristic function models of cooperative
games; coverage of social psychological models is restricted to those v^hich
make a_ priori predictions for either the formation of or the payoffs to
certain coalitions. These restrictions preclude, for instance, discussion
of the Nash equilibrium (1951) and Laing and Morrison's (1973) model of
sequential games.
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Game Theoretic Models
A major distinction in the study of n-person games is made between
cooperative and non-cooperative games. Cooperative games are those in which
the players have the opportunity to communicate with one another and to form
binding agreements. Non-cooperative games do no permit binding agreements,
and may even forbid communications. Thus, for example, the usual form of the
prisoner's dilemma game is non-cooperative. (Cooperative games, on the other
hand, are those where the players bargain to determine their pay offs.)
In describing cooperative games, most theoretic models utilize the
characteristic function- The characteristic function of
a game specifies a value or payoff to each possible coalition, including
one-person coalitions. For instance, a three-person game with outcomes of
1 for each two- and three-person coalition and for all one-person coalitions
would have the following characteristic function:
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = 0; v(AB) = v(AC) = v(BC) = v(ABC) = 1
where v( ) indicates the value or payoff to a coalition, and A, B, and C
are actors or parties in the game.
The characteristic function, then, emphasizes the payoffs that coalitions
receive: coalitions are differentiated on the basis of the payoffs they can
obtain.
Solutions and Subsolutlons
von Neumann, and Morgenstern's (1944) presentation of n-person conflict
situations led them to the question of x^Jhat outcomes might be considered
stable. They introduced the notions of imputations
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and domination. An imputation is a payoff configuration that satisfies
conditions of individual rationality (i.e., a party will not accept a
payoff from a coalition that is less than the payoff it can receive
playing alone) and Pareto optimality (i.e., a payoff will not be considered
if another payoff increases the outcomes of at least one of the included
parties while not reducing the payoffs of any of the other included parties)
.
Domination refers to a relationship between potential imputations: For a
game with characteristic function^, an imputation
_y = (y,,...,_y ), that
specifies a payoff for each of the n players, dominates an imputation x =
CSj, x„,...,x ) with respect to a non-empty coalition Q when the following
conditions are met:
(1) v(Q) > i=^ 1±
(2) _y. > X. for every 1_ in Q_.
An example of a set of imputations from the game mentioned earlier would be
(%, h, 0), (h, 0, h), (0, h, h)
where the imputations refer to payoffs to (A, B, C) when the AB coalition
has formed, the AC coalition has formed, and the BC coalition has formed,
respectively. An alternative imputation, (3/4, 0, h) , dominates the first
member of the above set of imputations. In other words, players A and C
receive greater payoffs in this second imputation than they did in the first,
and they have the power to enforce the new imputation if they wish. Notice
also that the third imputation in the above set dominates this alternative
imputation. A series of imputations, where one imputation succeeds and
dominates the previous imputation, could result in an endless string of
dominations. However, von Neumann and Korgenstern noted that certain sets
of imputations do promote at least a fragile form of stability. (For
instance, consider the situation where you are player A and player C offers
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you 3/4. If you realize that player S can then
retaliate with the third
Imputation in the above set, you may be content to stay
at a point where
you receive h-) They worked from two assumptions:
any solution set
should contain i,:nputations that (a) do not dominate each
other, and (b)
.
dominate any imputation outside the set. The example
above, where the
set of imputations gives a payoff of h to each member
of a coalition but
does not- specify which coalition will form, satisfied
both assumptions.
Thus it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution set. It
is not, however,
the only solution set for this game. For most
n-person games, there are
large numbers of solution sets. In addition, as with
other game theoretic
models, not only are the outcomes for particular
coalitions non-unique,
there is also little attempt to determine which coalition
(s) might form
most frequently.
An additional problem with von Neumann and Morgenstern' s
concept of
solution sets is the fact that they do not exist for every
n-person charac-
teristic function game. Lucas (1968) has found an example
of a ten-person
game that does not have a solution.
Recently Roth (1976) has reported a modificacion
of the concept of
solutions, called subsolutions. The concept of subsolutions
relaxes the
condition that states that any imputation outside the solution
set is
dominated by a member in the set to state that any imputation
outside the
set of subsolutions that dominates a member of the set is
in turn dominated
by another member of the set. In this way, only
imputations that "threaten"
members of the set need to be dominated by another member
of the set. This
modification removes the problem of the general existence of
solution sets,
but does not change the non-uniqueness of the solution
or the indeterminancy
of particular coaltions.
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There is another solution concept that has the advantage of yielding
fewer predictions for games where it is not empty. The core consists of
the imputations in a game that are undominated. For instance, in a game
with this characteristic function:
v(A) = v(B) = .v(C) = v(EC) - 0; v(AB) =--_v(AC) •=j/(ABC) = 1,
(where player A is essentially a monopolist) the core consists of a single
payoff conf iguTation, (1, 0, 0), where the monopolist obtains the entire
payoff. Any other payoff configuration is dominated by the core. For this
example, the core is an extreme point; in other games, it may not be so
extreme. The core is a compelling solution for game theorists, and is one
that is a subset of most of the game theoretic solution concepts (including
solutions and subsolutions) . The core of a. game, however, may not exist.
Bargaining Set Models
Another approach to n-person characteristic function games is that of
the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, 1964). A.s with solutions, the
bargaining set assumes individual rationality; it does not, however, assume
Pareto optimality. Rather, the bargaining set is based on the concepts of
objections and counter-objections. The bargaining set resembles the core
(which it contains) and is always non-empty. The use of an example makes
an explanation of the theory much easier. Consider the following charac-
teristic function game;
v(i) = 0; v(AR) = 70; v(AC) = 60; xC^C) = 50; v(ABC) - 75,
where _i refers to individual players. A, B, and C. Suppose that players A
and C are negotiating to divide the 60 points which they can obtain, with A
proposing that he receive 45 points, and C 15 points. Player C can raise
an objection to A by saying that he can form a coalition with player B,
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giving Player B 20 points (which is more than he would receive if A and C
formed a coalition), and obtaining 30 points for himself. Given this
objection, however, A can raise a counter-objection, saying that he can
retain his original 4.5 points in a coalition with B, and give E 25 points
(which is more than C is offering him in his objection).
In this example, one member of a potential coalition may attempt to
increase his payoffs by using his alternative coalitions as a threat. In
general, an objection of player^ against player j proposes an alternative
coalition Q, such that J. is included in ^, j is excluded from^, and the
members of coalition^ receive larger payoffs than they did previously.
A counter-objection also proposes an alternative coalition, say ^, where
player
_2 obtaiiis at least as much as he did in the original coalition xjith
player j, and where other members of^do at least as v/ell or better than
they did in ^. The bargaining set, then, consists of those payoff config-
urations where a valid counter-objection can be raised for any possible
objection. Thus, a fragile state of stability, similar in nature to the
solution concept of von Neumann and Morgenstern, is proposed.
For the last chai'scteristic function game mentioned above, the bargaining
set contains the following payoff configurations:
(40, 30, 0), (40, 0, 20), (0, 30, 20)
(It also contains elements for the grand coalition; however, different forms
of the bargaining set specify different outcomes for the grand coalition.)
Several relationships among the members of the bargaining set are interest5.ng
to note. In this example, as in other examples where v(i) = 0, v(ABC)
^ ii^yil , and y(ij) = some positive integer, the payoff configurations in
2
the bargaining set, regardless of the final coalition structure, specify
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constant payoffs to the players when they are included in the winning coali-
tion. Such games are called quota games, because quotas, a;., can be assigned
to each player such that:
v(ij) = 'U). + (ii., where i, j = A, B, C, and ± =f j
.
For quota games, Che bargaining set predicts that each player should receive
his quota. However, as wit?i the other models that have been discussed, the
bargaining set does not specify which of che possible coalitions might form
most frequently. For games that are more complicated than quota games, the
bargaining set does not predict a specific payoff for each of the included
players, but, rather, predicts a range of outcomes for each player. For
instance, consider the following characteristic function:
v(i) = ii(BC) = v(BD) = 0: v(Aj) = v(Ajk) = v(BCD) = 72,
where 1_ = any player, (A, B, C, cr D) , and j and _k^ = any player except A.
In this game, (called an Apex game), player A is denoted the Apex player
because he needs only one partner to form a winning coalition and can only
be excluded by a coalition of all the other players. The bargaining set
includes payoff configurations for the two person coalitions such that
36 ^ X < 54 and 18 ^ x. ^36, where x refers to the /Vpex player's payoffA J A
and X. refers to the payoff of A.'s coalition partner.
Two additional models, both of which are related to the bargaining set,
have been proposed in order to make more specific predictions for most
games. The kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965) for the game above specifies
equal outcomes for player A and his partner. The rationale for this outcome
is that when two or more potential coalition members trade objections and
counter-objections, one player may, in a sense, "outweigh" another if the
excess payoff he can receive from an alternative coalition exceeds the
excess payoff his potential coalition partner can receive in the alternative
coalition he proposes. Thus, an equilibrium state may occur when neither
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player "outv/eighs" the other, i.e., when the excess each can obtain from
alternative coalitions is equal. For three-person quota games, the kernel
and the bargaining set are identical. For more complicated games, the
kernel is included in the bargaining set and is the "equality" endpoint of
the range of payoff configurations in the bargaining set, i.e., X =36, X.=36, abcv/e.
A . J
Another variation of the bargaining set, the competitive bargaining
set (Horowitz, 1972), predicts the opposite endpoint of the bargaining
set's range of predictions. The competitive bargaining set assumes that
players not included in the originally considered coalition will not sit
by passively, waiting for one member of this coalition to make an objection,
but will make proposals themselves. Thus, a strong objection that a member
of a potential coalition can make would be that Horowitz called a multi-
threat
,
i.e., an objection that says that a player can obtain higher payoffs
in any alternative coalition. The other potential coalition partner may
then be able to make a counter multi- threat
,
stating that he/she can also
do better in any other coalition. The set of outcomes in the competitive
bargaining set, then, consists of those payoff configurations where a
counter-multi-threat can be raised for any multi- threat. For the example
above, the competitive bargaining set specifies outcomes of 54 for player
A and 18 for his partner.
The Shapley Value
Shapley (1953) approached n-person games from an entirely different
perspective by attempting to make an &_ priori evaluation of the game for
each of the players. To do so Shapley stated three axioms that any value
function should have.-^ Re then proved that a function satisfying these
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axioms existed and that it was unique. The resulting function can be inter-
preted by assuming that: (1) the coalition of all the players forms in a .
random order, adding one player at a time; (2) each player receives the
marginal payoff which accrues to the coalition when he/she joins; and
(3) each of the all-player coalitlous is equally likely. The Shapley value
for player i_, then equals I
-j'^ii ? where P. refers to the probability of one
order of formation and x^ . refers to the marginal payoff assigned to player
1 in that order. P^ecently Roth (1977) has sho\vTi that for players who are
risk neutral, such a value is equivalent to a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
for playing a game.
For the quota game mentioned earlier in this paper > where v(i) = 0;
_v.(AS) = 70; v(AC) = 60; v(BC) - 50; v(ABC) = 75, the Shapley values for
players (A, B, C) are (30, 25, 20).
The Shapley value has been interpreted as a measure of a player's
pivotal power in the sense that it assigns a value to each of the players
depending on when their presence in a coalition is pivotal. The Shapley
value has also been used as the basis for a social psychological model of
coalition formation, minimum power theory (Gamson, 1954) . An assumption
that players will diviae the payoffs they receive from particular coalitions
in proportion to the pivotal power they contribute to that coalition allox^/s
minimum power theory to predict that the viinnlng coalition (s) that require
the least total pivotal power will form most frequently. This model will
be discussed further with the other social psychological models. It is
worth mentioning, however, that minimum power theory is the only model
that draws from both game theory and social psychology in formulating
preditions.

10
Social Psychological Models
While the game theoretic >nodels have focused on Che different payoffs
coalitions can obtain, the social psychological models have focused on the
differing amounts of resources that players can bring to coalitions. This
emphasis originated with the first social psychological model of coalition
behavior (Caplow, 1956) and has allowed the inodels to predict, in most cases,
not only how coalition members thrill divide the payoff they receive, but also
what coalition will form. While this result is an advantage relative to the
game theoretic models, the social psjrchological models are less elegant than
those of game theory, and, in particular, rarely consider what the optimal
strategies might be in particular coalition situations. This reflects the
descriptive philosophy underlying the social psychological models, as
against the normative philosophy underlying the game theoretic models.
Caplow's Model
Caplow's (1965) model was the first social psychological theory of
coalition forniation. Caplow stated that players will attempt to "control"
as many other players as possible. In -aplow's terms, all members of a
coalition control players outside the coalition, and, within the coalition,
the member (s) with the most resources control the other coalition member (s)
.
Resources are important, then, to determine whom one controls within a
coalition. (They are also important to determine majority coalitions).
Caplow listed six types of coalitions that differed in the relationship
between the players' resources. Tv70 types gave one player dictatorial power;
the remaining four types, for player A, B, and C, v/ere: (1) A = B = C;
(2) A > B, B = C, A < (B + C); (3) A > B > C, A < (B -i- C) ; and (4) A < B, B = C.

11
The model then made predictions en the basis of each player's attempt to
maximize control over the others. For instance, in the second type, above,
a BC coalition would give A control over no one, B control over one player,
and C control over one. Because this was the best that B could do in the
situation, he/she preferred it; because it was the best that C could do in
the situation, he/she preferred it. Thus, the niodel predicts the BC coali-
tion in games of this type. The model does not predict, however, what the
payoff distribution will be. In addition, it is restricted to three-person
coalition situations.
Caplow (1959) qualified his predictions by stating that control is
Important only in continuous coalition situations. In episodic situations,
where rewards are obtained in periodic, predetermined conditions, control
is not as important as sharing in the payoffs. Given an episodic situation,
then, Caplow' s model predicts that, except for situations where a dictator
exists, any coalition should form, and the best prediction for the reward
division is an equal split. Caplow (1959) also stated that if the conflict
situation is a terminal one, where all the players fight until only one
remains, coalitions will only form when two of the players have equal
resources; they will coalesce and terminate the existence of the third
player, while continuing to exist themselves in what might be called a state
of uneasy detente .
Most of the data on coalitions in the triad has been collected on the
Type 3 game; the results indicate that the BC coalition is most frequent.
Because Caplow' s original model predicted either the AC or the BC coalition
in this type of game, Chertkoff (1967) proposed a revised version of the
model. Chertokoff noted that an assumption of reciprocated choice would
allow the Caplow model to make accurate predictions of the BC coalition in
type 3 games. Caplow' s original analysis stated that in this coalition type.
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C is indifferent between either the AC or the BC coalitions (in each he con-
trols one player and is controlled by one). Likewise, player A is indifferent
between the AB and the AC coalitions (he controls both players in each).
Player B, however, prefers the BC coalition (where he controls two players).
Thus, B will always, according to the theory, choose player C as his coali-
tion partner. Chertkoff noted that if one multiplies the proportions of
individual choices to determine the probability of reciprocal choices, the
BC coalition should occur 50% of the time, the AC coalition should occur 25%
of the time, and no reciprocal choices will occur the remaining 25% of the time.
If the players are allo'w»ed to make new choices when no coalition forms, the BC
coalition should result twice as often, overall, as the AC coalition. For
the other triad types, this additional assumption results in no change in
the model's predictions. This change, as will be discussed below, improves
the model's predictions for much of the data that has been reported.
Minimum Resource Theory
Gamson (1961a) proposed his minimum resource theory to predict not only
what coalition might be expected to form in a coalition situation, but also
what payoffs the members of that coalition might receive. Gamson assumed
that the players would attempt to naximize their payoffs (an assumption which
is common to almost all coalition theories) and that they would expect their
payoffs to be determined by the parity norm, i.e., each player's payoffs
would be directly proportional to the resources he contributed to the coali-
tion. For instance, in a coalition situation where players A, B, and C had
resources (votes) of 4, 3, and 2, respectively, players B and C would expect
to divide the payoff such that B received 60% and C Received A0%. These two
assumptions lead to the prediction that the coalition with the least amount
of resources necessary to form a majority will form and that the coalition
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members will divide the payoff accord3.ng to the parity norm. Such coalitions
will maximize the coalition members' individual rewards because no allotments
will be necessary for resources in excess of the minimum necessary. Gamson's
minimum resource theory makes predictions identical to Chertokoff s revision
of Caplow's models in the six types of triads, and also maice predictions
for the payoff division. In addition, the theory applies to any n-person
(n >_ 3) coalition situation where the players are assigned resources.
Garason's use of an equity-like principle (i.e., the proportion of a
player's inputs are expected to be equal to the proportion of his/her outcomes)
is also the underlying assumption in n-.ininium power theory (mentioned previously).
Instead of using resources as a measure oJ: a person's inputs, minimum power
theory uses pivotal power as a measure of one's contributions. Thus, although
the two models make quite different predictions in a number of situations,
their underlying philosophy is quite similar.
Bargaining Theory
Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) bargaining theory represents a radical
departure from earlier m.odels of coalition forraatiou. Unlike all of the
other models which have been discussed, bargaining theory' predicts that, for
most games, the players' rew^ards will change over time. (The other models
make only static predictions.) The predictions are based on the use of
alternative coalitions as threats during the bargaining process. For
instance, if players A and C are bargaining over the rewards they will
receive from an AC coalition in the 4-3-2 game, both A and C will use the
possibility of forming a coalition with B as a threat. Thus, bargaining
theory utilizes some of the underlying logic of bargaining set theory.
It also utilizes one of the assumptions of minimum resource theory, i.e.,
that players will use the parity norm in determining their expected rewards.
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However, bargaining theory also considers the possibility that the players
may also use an "equality norm," i.e., all players divide the payoff equally.
In fact, the prediction for the initial trial is that the players will expect
their rewards to be midway between the parity and the equality norm's predic-
tions. The coalition which maximizes the player's tewards, given such
expectations, is predicted to form. On subsequent trials, the model predicts
that the players will use their maximum expectation from alternative coali-
tions
^
whether that is determined by the parity norm or the equality norm,
as a threat in their negotiations. The predictions for payoff divisions at
the asymptotic trial are derived by assuming that each player's reward will
be proportional to his/her maximum expectation in alternative coalitions.
The model predicts that, as the trials progress, the players will form
coalitions that minimize their temptation to defect. This temptation to
defect is smallest in the coalition that minimizes the discrepancy
between the predicted asymptotic reward and the players maximum expectation
from alternative coalitions.
For example, in the 4-3-2 game, the predictions for the initial trial
are that the BC coalition will form and will divide the payoff so that B
receives 55% and C receives 45% (which is midway between equality, i.e.,
50%-50%, and parity, 60%-40%) . On the asymptotic trial, however,
bargaining theory predicts that the BC coalition will form and that B will
receive 50% and C will receive 50%. Both player's maximimum expectations
in alternative coalitions (i.e., AB and AC) are 50%, as determined by the
equality norm. Their threats are equal and, therefore, the theory's pre-
dictions are for an equal payoff division. In additions their predicted
payoffs equal their maximim expectations in alternative coalitions, thus
reducing their temptation to defect to zero.
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Bargaining theory, then, makes differential predictions for the most
frequent coalition and its members' payoffs over trials on the basis of
the quality of the players' alternatives. It does not, however, specify
when the asymptotic trial will occur. It also does not make predictions
for situations where maximum expectations cannot be determined, i.e.,
when resources are not assigned to the players.
The Weighted Probability Model
Komorita (1974) also proposed the weighted probability model to account,
at least in part, for the preponderance of coalitions where the number of
members was as small as possible. In coalition situations that include
more than three players, either two- or three-person coalitions can often
attain a majority. Smaller coalitions are expected to occur more frequently
than larger coalitions because a large coalition may not only be "more
difficult to form but may also be more difficult to maintain" (Komorita,
1974, p. 243). The weighted probability model assumes that individuals
will attempt to maximize their rewards, that minimum winning coalitions
will form, and that the probability of a coalition's forming is an inverse
function of its size:
w
P(C.) = -A
2 zw.
j.
where E.(G., ) is the probability that coalition j will form, and w.. = l/(n.-l),
the weight that indicates the difficulty in forming coalition j^ as a function
of n,, the number of players included in it. The theory presently assumes
that
:
P. = >:P(C..), if-C.,
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where P. is the probability that player i_ will be included in the winning
coalition, C., and where the summation is over all minimum winning coalitions
which include player i. The model then assumes that the player
rewards that are proportional to their probability of inclusion (a notion
which, like lainimum resource and miniraurn power theories, is an equity-like
principle)
:
li
S.. .
= —^-
,
k £ C
,
ij IP, J
~-
—
k
where R equals player I's expected reward in coalition C and where the
"il
"
1
summation is over ail the members of C. Finally, in the event that two
or more coalitions of equal size present an individual with the same
expected reward, the model assximes that he/she will choose the coalition
where the players have equal or relatively equal resources.
The model's predictions can be. interpreted by noting that resources
are instrumental only in determining the rainimtmi winning coalitions; the
minimum winning; coalition (s) with the fewest number of players should form.
Unlike bargaining theory; determination of tlie players' expected rewards
depends on the quantity and size o£ his/her alternatives rather than the
quality of his/her alternatives. A player with twice as many equal-sized
alternatives as another player v/ill be predicted to receive a payoff that
is tv;ice the size of the other player's.
For instance, in a game where a majority of thirty votes is needed in
a winning coalition, and where players (A, B, C, D, E) have (24, 9, 8, 7, 6)
votes, player A has three times as many minimum winning alternatives as
player B (i.e., AC, AD, and AE versus BCDE) if they are considering an
AB coalition. This is also true for a comparison of player A and players
C, D, and E. Thus, the model predicts that player A should receive 75% of
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of the rewards in a two-person coalition, while his partner should receive
25% of the rewards. In addition, although players B, C, D, and E differ
in the amount of resources at their disposal, the number of alternative
coalitions they can forrfi is equal and, therefore, predicted payoffs are equal.
The weighted probability model has an advantage over the other social
psychological models because: (1) it does not depend on the allotment of
resources to the players; and (2) it makes exact predictions for the proba-
bilities of the different coalitions. Its applications are restricted,
however, to simple majority garoes, where the priEe to a majority coalition
is constant.
Other Models
Two other models will not be seriously discussed because their predic-
tions are even more limited than those of the models that have been presented.
One game theoretic model that will not be discussed at length but which
considers cooperative, characteristic function games is the Nash bargaining
solution (Nash, 19 53). The Nash bargaining solution includes that outcome
which maximizes the product of the rewards of the players when they all
coalesce. For instance, in a game where three players (A, B, C) can receive
payoffs (X,, X^, X^) , the Nash bargaining solution is the outcome whichA tJ C
maximizes the product (XX X ). Because it assvimes that all the playersABC
will come to an agreement, i.e., that the grand coalition will form, its
predictions are somewhat limited; it does not make predictions for coali-
tions which do not include all the players.
A social psychological model, anticompetitive theory, (Gamson, 1964)
makes predictions based almost entirely on the sex of the players. As a
result of the data from several studies, Vlnacke (1971) has concluded that
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females in coalition situations tend to exhibit "accoimnodative" beiiavior:
they tend to form larger than minimum winning coalitions; they tend to
split payoffs equally regardless of their power position; they tend to
make proposals which are not in their o\\ni interests, etc. Males, on the
other hand, have tended to exhibit "exploitative" behavior, showing a
strong drive to win and playing very competitively. The anticompetitive
model predicts sex differences in coalition behavior, but makes few
specific predictions concerning which coalition will form and how the
coalition members will apportion the rewards.
Empirical Findings
The empirical findings concerning coalition behavior have rarely con-
sidered both game theoretic and social psychological models in the same
study. Rather, independent empirical investigations have been undei'taken
within the two areas. The research, then, will be briefly summarized as
it relates to the two areas.
Experiments in Game Theory
Kalisch, Milnor, Nash, and Jfering (1954) conducted the first experimental
studies in game theory. Tneir results, however, may have been particular to
the individuals in their lirndted sample (eight people). In addition, most
of the games they investigated were played only once. Similar limitations
hamper the interpretation of studies by Maschler (Note 2) and Selten and
Schuster (1968). Riker's studies (1967; 1971) can also be questioned,
because the experimenters discussed the strategies which the players might
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lave used prior to several of the sessions, resulting in disparate informa-
ion bases among groups of subjects.
Buckley and Westen have conducted two studies (Buckley and Westen, 1973;
Jesten and Buckley, 1974) which investigated four- and five-person games
/ith constant payoffs to majority coalitions. Their results indicate that
.n such games, the most frequent outcomes are majority coalitions which
livide the payoff equally. They have also reported (Buckley and Westen,
.976) a slight superiority for the kernel and the bargaining set over
/on Neumann and Morgenstern's solutions in these games. Lieberman (1971)
reports similar findings for three-person games.
Lieberman (1962) presents the results of the first experiment investi-
gating quota games. The three-person zero -sum quota game he studied yielded
ijuotas of 6, 4, and 2 for players A, B, and C, Players were allowed to send
messages to one another, and reciprocal agreements were required for the
formation of coalitions. The results indicated that coalitions AB and BC
were most frequent, and equal divisions of the payoff again predominated.
From the subjects' messages and their post-experimental responses, Lieberman
observed that the players "would enter into coalitions with the player they
trusted, the one they believed vjould not be tempted to defect from their
coalition for a more attractive offer on the next play of the game."
Rapoport and his colleagues have used a computerized procedure in a
series of experiments (Horowitz and Rapoport, 1974; Kahan and Rapoport, 1974,
1976; Medlin, 1976; Rapoport and Kahan, 1976). All of the studies have
focused on the predictions of the bargaining set (or subset of the bargaining
set) for quota games. The basic paradigm consists of the players playing
each of several games, randomly rotating their positions in the games. In
the three-person games, groups of four players rotate through the positions.
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with one player observing each game. Agreements are reached when an offer
has been sent, accepted by the recipient, and ratified by the offer's
originator.
•Four of the five studies investigated the same set of five games
(see Table 1). The first study (Kahan and Rapoport, 1974) in the series
studied the five games and the effects of public or secret offers. The
results indicated that AB coalitions were more frequent that AC or BC
coalitions, and that, overall, the players' payoffs were quite close to
their quotas, supporting the bargaining set. There were effects due to
games. Indicating that player A received more than his quota in Games II
and III, where the BC coalitions were most frequent. In the other games,
BC coalitions were relatively infrequent and player A received somewhat
less than a quota payoff.
Two studies in the series (Medlin, 1976; Rapoport and Kahan, 1976)
investigated the effects of a range of values taken by the grand coalition
for the same five games. The results indicated that the grand coalition
formed frequently when it was possible, and that it became more frequent
as its payoff increased. One of these two studies (Rapoport and Kahan, 1976)
found a difference in games: ABC coalitions were not frequent in Game V.
Instead, AB coalitions were again the most frequent in this game. Medlin
(1976), however, found no differences in the frequency of the grand
coalition over games.
Kahan and Rapoport (1976) found that one-person values affected the
formation of coalitions, the payoffs to coalition members, and the bargaining
processes. In particular, they found that the results when one-person values
were symmetric to the players' quotas were similar to earlier results
(Kahan and Rapoport, 1974), when the one-person values were zero. In the
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inversely symmetric conditions, however, AB cos lit ions were very frequent,
even when the grand coalition was possible. Player C, who had a relatively
high one-person value, but a lov; quota, v?as often content to take his
one-person value . Player A, on the other hand, who had a relatively
low one-person value tut a high quota, was eager to eiiter a coalition,
and tended to receive payoffs thaf were lower than his quota. 'Thus, the
results in this condition did not support the bargaining set predictions.
The authors present what they call a "quota-value model", one that
borrows both from the bargaining set and the Shapley value, to explain
their results. The model does explain the results in both the symmetric
and inversely symmetric conditions better than the other raodels considered.
However, it has not been tested on additional data and will not be
considered in depth here.
The fifth study using the North Carolina paradigm (Horowitz and
Rapoport, 1974) investigated four- and five-person Apex games (one of
which was used as an exaraple earlier in this paper). The study varied:
(1) the order for the presentation of offers, with the Apex player
either first or last; and (2) the value of the Apex coalition (for half
of the groups it was 1.5 times larger than the payoff for the coalition
of all the other players) . The kernel and the competitive bargaining
set models make different predictions in these games, and, thus, this
study was able to contrast them empirically. The bargaining set for
these games is defined by a range of outcomes from the kernel to the
competitive bargaining set.
Tlie results indicated that the Apex coalition occurred in 45 of
43 plays. The Apex player's payoffs were significantly higher when he
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made his offers first rather than last. Most importantly, the payoffs to
the players were within the bargaining set and were considerably closer
to the competitive bargaining set's predictions than to the kernel's.
Two studies of a different nature have recently been completed by
Murnighan and Roth (1977, Note 3) These studies ivestigated the effects
of information and communication opportunities on the behavior of a mono-
polist in three-person and large-group games. Coalitions received a constant
payoff of 100 points, and the plaj^ers stayed In the same position throughout
the game. Each study investigated the effects of five conditions that
varied whether the payoff division was secret or announced, whether the
players offers, acceptances, and rejections were secret or announed, and
whether messages were allowed. (The first study also investigated the
effects of announcing the messages, although this had no additional effect).
The results in three-person groups indicated that the monopolists'
mean payoffs ranged from 56.5 to 76.7, and that secret payoff divisions
and announced offers led to increases in his payoffs over trials and higher
overall payoffs than the message conditions. In the second study, where
group size ranged from 7 to 12, the monopolists' payoffs ranged from
83.7 to 93.9, and they showed increases over trials in the payoff announced,
offers announced, and secret messages conditions. In addition, a significant
correlation between group size and the m.onopolists' payoffs was observed in the
messages condition. The two sets of results suggest that communication
opportunities and group size interact and affect a monopolist's payoffs.
In particular, with small groups (i.e., three-person), coronunication
opportunities seemed to linit the monopolist's payoffs; with larger groups,
communication opportunities tended to limit the monopolists' payoffs if
the group was not very large (approximately 10 players or more) . Further
research is needed to test this implication.
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The Mumighan and Roth studies also investigated the predictability
of several game theoretic and psychological caodels. The game used in these
studies, where one player was a rconopolist, resulted in identical predic-
tions for the Weighted Probability Model and Minimum Pov/er Theory ,
Each TTiOdel predicts that the r^ouopolist's payoff should be 100 - ^
., where
n = the number of players in the group. The predictions were supported '
in the three-person groups, and received some support, in the messages
conditions, in the large group study.
The data were also compared to Bargaining Theory (Komorita and
Chertkoff , 1973) and the game theoretic concept of the core (cf . , Luce
and Raiffa, 1957). With the assiraiption that the monopolist's maximum
expectation is the entire payoff of 100 points. Bargaining Theory pre-
dicts that the monopolist should receive a constant payoff of 75 points
regardless of group size or the nuirtber of trials played. This prediction
is unusual for Bargaining Theory, which nortaally predicts changes in
payoffs over trials. The data from the three-person study support the
predictions in two of the sir. conditions; the large-group study, however,
found no support for the model.
The game theoretic concept of the core subsumes the predictions of
all of the forms of the Bargaining Set (Aumann and Maschler, 1964). For
the two studies, the core solution indicates that the monopolist will
receive the entire 100 points. Although this extreme predictions was
not strictly supported in either study, the increases in the monopolists'
payoffs over trials in the no messages conditions indicates that, in
both studies, the bargaining was moving toward the core. In addition,
in the large group study, the monopolist received 99 points or more in
64 of the 147 agreements in the no messages groups. Thus, the data

Models of
Coalition Formation
24
show some support for the core solution.
In summary, results from experimer.ts using characteristic function games
generally support the predictions of the bargaining set, although this
support has not been universal (e.^., Murnighan and Roth, 1577a). The .
availability of communication opoortuiiitits has United the payoffs of
a player with veto power. 'ResuitrS pertaining to solutions andsubsolu-
tions seem to favor subsolutions. And the core, although study on its
predictions have been rare, appears to receive support in some situations.
Social Psychological Research
Empirical research on coalition behavior by social psychologists
has primarily focused on interactions in triads. Caplow's (1956) early
impetus plus the convenience of studying the smallest possible group size
have probably contributed to this emphasis. In particular ^ triads whose
resources are distributed so that A > B > C and A < (B + C) have received
the most attention. This may be due tc Vinacke and Arkoff's (1957)
results for the 4-3-2 game. They found that the 3-2 coalition was most
frequent and, thus, did not support Caplow's original theory (which
predicted either the 4-2 or the 3-2 coalition).
From a game theoretic perspective, the studies on triads are some-
what limited in their generalizability. Triads can produce at most three
distinct game types: (!) where each player is equal (but may differ from
other players in the number of votes he/she controls); (2) where one
player has veto power and laust be included iu every coalition although
he/she cannot win alone; and (3) where one player is a dictator and can
win by playing alone. Almost all of the studies on the triad have
investigated the first of these three situations; many (ex., Chertkoff,
1970; Stryker, 1972) have found that the two players with the fev;est

Models of
Coalition Formation
25
resources are most likely to form coalitions. Thus the conclusion that
"strength is weakness" has been frequent. This conclusion, however, may
be an artifact of games where a coalition can be formed by a majority of
the players, regardless of the composition of that majority. In three-
person games of this type, the player who controls the most resources
in these games has conditional power
,
that is, power "only if the other
members of the group do not form a coalition. In Vinacke and Arkoff 's
paradigm, for instance, the player with four votes in the 4-3-2 game
will win il_ the other players do not form a coalition. Vinacke and
Arkoff report that no coalition forms approximately 2% of the trials.
Thus, it is almost certain that a coalition will form, and that the
player with four votes will have no more power than the other players.
The three-person studies, then, generally show that coalitions with
the least number of resources will form. Kelley and Arrowood (1960)
,
however, reported that after several trials with each player playing in the
same position, coalitions between the two players with the least number of
resources are no more frequent than the other coalitions. Thus, even
the stability of the "strengh is weakness" conclusion is questionable.
Because of the possibility of limited generalizability of the
three-person studies, the present paper will focus on research conducted
on larger groups (n >^ 4) . Games with larger groups have particular
advantages in that they can investigate both the generalizability of
the "strength is weakness" conclusion and more than three patterns of
power among the group members.
The first social psychological study of tetrads was conducted by
Willis (1962) in an attempt to extend Caplow's (1956) theory for triads.
Willis studied two games, where resources were distributed 4-4-3-2 and
5-3-3-2. (It is interesting to note that the player with 2 votes in
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the first game v;as completely superfluous—he could only be a member of
non-minimum winning coalitions.) Willis reported that two-person coali-
tions (4-4 and two 4-3 's in the first, game and between 5 and any other
player in the second game) were oq..ially frequent. Among the three-person
coalitions, those predicted by an extended version of Caplow's theory
were most frequent. CK'erall, two-person coalitions were most frequent,
tending to support the more recent models. The presentation of the data,
however, makes more specific conclusions difficult.
Shears (1966) also studied tvjo games with four players. She found
that two person coalitions were Diore frequent than three-person coalitions
in a 4-2-2-1 and 3-1-1-1 game ^^'here player 3 has veto powei^ In addition,
the data for payoff division seem to support the predictions of the
Weighted Probability model, compared to >finirauK Resource, Minimum Power,
and Bargaining theory. However, the data were collected prior to
the presentation of the theories, and thus, support for a theory may
be confounded with the use of the data in constructing the theory.
The two studies do support the conclusion that coalitions will form with
the smallest number of players more frequently than larger coalitions.
This explicitly supports the Weighted Probability model and implicitly
supports Bargaining theory (which also tends to predict the formation
of the smallest coalitions)
.
Chertkoff (1971) investigated the possibility that the formation of
small coalitions could have been due to a procedural artifact. Three-
person coalitions form in two "steps": in the first step a two-person
coalition must form; then, in the second step, a third coalition member
is added. Compared to two-person coalitions, which form in one "step,"
three-person coalitions may be less frequent due to procedural difficulties
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rather than to factors inherent in the game or the other inanupulations.
Chertkoff investigated three games: 80-50-30; 80 -(30-30)-30; and 30-30-30-30.
Each game was played for one trial. A comparison of the last two games,
where a "weak" coalition between two of the 30 players was manipulated,,
showed that the (30-30)-30 coalition was considerably more frequent
than the 30-30-30 coalition, indicating that procedural effects may
have influenced the earlier results. The overall results tended to
support Bargaining Theory over the other \iiodels, while the data from the
four-person games tended to support both Bargaining Theory and the Weighted
Probability model. Again, however, these dsta predate the models they
support.
Komorita and Meek (Note 1) revised the earlier coalition formation
procedures to allow three-person coalitions to form in a single step.
Player X could make an offer for an XYZ coalition by sending the same
three-person proposal to both Y and Z. If both accepted, the JCYZ
coalition formed. Thus, a two-person coalition was not a prerequisite for
a three-person coalition. Komorita and Meek studied tv/o games: 8-3-3-3
and 8-4-3-2. Players played the same position for several trials and
were instructed to obtain as many points as they could. Tv.fo-person
coalitions were significantly more frequent than three-person coalitions
in both games. In addition, the frequencies of the different two-person
coalitions in the 8-4-3-2 game were not significantly different from one
another. In addition to reinforcing the finding that small coalitions
are most frequent, this study suggests that the "strength is weakness"
conclusion m.ay not generalize to four-person coaiiirion situations. The
data also support Bargaining theory and the Weigatad Probability model
over other models again in a pre-theory fashion.
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Komorita and Moore (1976) report the first study to test the two
recent models after they were proposed. They studied tetrads of males
and females in a 10-9-8-3 game, where any three players could form a
majority coalition. Thus, this study tested both the predictions of
the models and the "strength is weakness" hypothesis. The models pre-
dictions are: (1) Minimum Resource theory: 9-8-3 coalition with payoffs
of (45-40-15); (2) Bargaining theory: 9-8-3, (36-34-30)i and (3) Minimum
Power theory and the Weighted Probability model: any coalition, (33-33-33).
The results indicated that the 9-8-3 was most frequent, and that the 10-
9-8 coalition was fairly frequent for females. The player's outcomes
changed over trials: player 10' s outcomes decreased over trials while
player 3's outcomes Increased ever trials. All the players' outcomes
tended to approach equality as the trials progressed. Thus, Minimum
Power theory and the Weighted Probability model received some support
for their predictions of the player's outcomes. Minimum Resource theory
received support for its prediction of the 9-8-3 coalition, but was
not supported with respect to the players' outcomes. Bargaining theory's
predictions were supported for both coalition frequencies and the players'
outcomes. The results for males supported the theories more than the results
for females. Vlnacke's notion (1971) of anticompetitiveness in females, then,
was supported again by this study.
Murnighan, Komorita, and Szwajkowski (1977) recently completed a study
of tetrads in three different games: 8-3-3-3, 8-7-1-1, and 8-7-7-7. The
study compared the predictions of the models and manipulated the reference
groups of the players to reveal some of the underlying motivations of the
players with respect to their instructions. The players' reference groups
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were either the players they were bargaining with or players in other
groups who were playing in the same position as themselves. The results
supported both Bargaining Theory and the Weighted Probability model over
Minimum Resource and Minimum Power theories. Bargaining theory made
excellent predictions for coalition frequency and payoff division in
the 8-3-3-3 and the 8-7-7-7 games; the Weighted Probability model
made excellent predictions of the coalition frequencies in each game.
The reference group manipulation indicated that there was greater competi-
tion and more support for each of the theories when players had reference
groups of other similar players. This result reinforces Komorita and
Moore's (1976) findings for females: it appears that the theories' predic-
tions receive the most support when the players are competitively motivated.
Departures from this condition (due to sex or reference groups) reduces
their predictability and generalizability.
Two studies have been conducted on larger groups- Gamson (1961b) investi-
gated five-person groups in three different games. The use of a procedure
that separated the formation of a coalition from the division of the payoff
among the coalition members limits the applicability of the results.
Vinacke (1971) conducted a study with male and female groups, and
varied the number of players for each of five games. Three of the games
were inappropriate for differentiating the predictions of the relevant
models. The other two were: (1) "All Different", where each player's
resources differed (e.g., 5-4-3-2-1); and (2) "One Strong-One Weak", where
one player was given one vote, (n-2) players were given 2 votes, and the
strong player was given 2 (n-2) votes- The results neither support nor
reject any of the models discussed here. As in the earlier studies, however,
sex differences were apparent. Females tended to display accomodative
behavior;
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males tended to display exploitative behavior. This was particularly evident
in the dictatorship and monopolist games: female dictators and female mono-
polists did not push for higher payoffs. Instead, they often included un~
necessary players in the coalitions and demanded relatively low payoffs
for thenselves.
In suET.iary, the research on coalition behavior in situations with
four or more players has typically found that, if two-person coalitions
are possible, they will be more frequent than three-person coalitions.
In addition the players' outcom.es generally support the predictions of
Bargaining Theory and the Weighted Probability model. Minimum Resource
theory and Minimum Power theory have received relatively little supports
Conclus ions and Future Directions
Research and theory on coalition beriavior has continued sporadically
for thirty years. Due to the inherent difficulties of research on groups,
progress has been slow and the results to date lead to more questions than
conclusions. The conclusions that can be drawn are almost completely
rooted in one of the D^^o basic traditions, game theory and social psychology.
Game theory has focused on differences in the payoffs that different coali-
tions can obtain. Theory has continuously revolved around this variable,
and researc'h has found differences in Che players' payoffs and (unpredicted)
differences in coalition frequencies as a result of differences in coalition
payoffs. The ability to obtain high payoffs has been theoretically related
to the elusive concept ol pov7er (Shapley and Shubik, 1954), and if power
is measured by the total payoffs a player obtains during a coalition game,
experimental findings support this approach.
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Game theoretic research has also found differences in players' payoffs
due to the opportunity to communicate with other players. Results also
tend to vary, although to a lesser degree, with differences in the amount
of information each player has. Thus, the game theoretic literature hag
successfully pursued the investigation of coalition behavior from the
perspective of payoff differences, communication opportunities,' and
information availability.
Social psychological models, on the other hand, have emphasized
differences in resources rather than differences in payoffs. Research
has shown that differences in resources affect the frequency of formation
of different coalitions and the payoffs that players with different
resources obtain. The results, however, are not straightforward. Indeed,
conclusions that imply that more resources are an advantage can not be made
consistently. Thus, the implications fronj the social psychological
research to the study of power are not clearcut. Resources do have an
effect on coalition behavior; the direction and the extent of the effect
may interact with the type of game under study.
Social psychological research has also found consistent results
pertaining to the sex of the player. Females generally display accomodative
behavior: they tend to be cooperative rather than competitive; they pay
close attention to the social aspects of bargaining; they tend to be
altruistic rather than aggressive. Men, on the other hand, tend to display
exploitative behavior, the converse of accomodative behavior. Even in the
research reported recently, sex differences have been evident. The generali-
zability of these results to the entire female population, especially x^?hen
the predominant subject population has been college undergraduates, requires
testing in future research.
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One variable that has received some attention in both areas recently
has been changes in coalition behavior over time (i.e., the bargaining
process). Rapoport and his colleagues have utilized a procedure where the
process that results in each agreement can be investigated with respect,
to the first offer made, the first offer accepted, etc. Social psycholo-
gists (e.g., Komorita and Moore, 1976; Murnlghan, et^ al . , 1977)' Kave studied
games that are played for several trials. The demands of the players, the
number of offers each receives, etc. , can be analyzed in an attempt to
understand the bargaining process that emerges within coalition situations.
A series of six trials, then, is not viewed as six independent games; rather,
researchers now are considering such a series of trials as a single taeta-
or super-game. This approach has also been used in recent game theoretic
research (e.g., Murnighan and Roth, 1977).
Thus, the paths taken by the bargaining process are being investigated,
and evidence about the bases of some of the current models can be observed
during these processes. The inherent assumption in Bargaining theory, that
players will learn hov.- powerful they are as the trial progress, can be tested.
Similarly, the success and failure of justified objections in characteristic
function games contributes to tests of the validity of Bargaining Set theory.
In addition, observation of the entire process and its results gives greater
insight into the possibility that an equilibrium coalition or set of coalitions
might result, however tenuous. In this way, the models that make static pre-
dictions (e.g., Gamson's Minimum Resource Theory, which makes a single
prediction, regardless of the number of trials to be played) can be assessed
to determine whether the models are supported at particular points (e.g.,
early or late) during a lengthy bargaining situation. For instance, investi-
gation of the coalition process has indicated that, in some studies, bargain-
ing has moved toward the core (e.g., Murnighan and Roth, Note 3) or toward

Models of
Coalition Formation
33
the predictions of the Weighted Probability Model (Komorita and Moore, 1976).
In addition to allowing for more precise theoretical tests, investiga-
tion of the coalition bargaining process allows for the detection of different
levels of skill in bargaining. If the results of coalition studies are even
to be compared to the behavior of experienced negotiators, the players
must become sophisticated bargainers. Study of the frequencies of different
coalitions and the outcomes of different players do not allow a researcher/
analyst to determine the skill level of the players. Although the results
nay be the same (or nearly the same) for sophisticated and uiisophisticated
bargainers, the process that contrj-butes to the formation of coalitions for
the two sets of players can be markedly different.
Another variable that has received some attention by the two areas
has been the differences in games. Rapoport and his colleagues have completed
a systematic study of five different games, and have found some consistent
differences between the games. The research of social psychologists
have typically included m.ore than a single game. The selection of games,
however, has been relatively unsystematic since Vinacka and Arkoff's (1957)
initial study.
With little exception, then, research on coalition behavior has
suffered from both the absence of systematic study of the potential
variables that -may affect the players' behavior and the relatively uncoor-
dinated thrusts in the two areas. Several directions for future research
stand out clearly. Research and theory that investigates both differential
payoffs for the possible coalitions and differential resource distributions
ainong the players would be a m.ajor contribution. Both variables have had con-
siderable effects on coalition behavior when they have been studied independently,
Research that studies them together may indicate which variable contributes
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most to the behavior of coalition bargainers, and which theoretical
approach best predicts that behavior. The outcomes and strategies used by
players with many resources and a relative inability to obtain high coali-
tion payoffs, for instance, can be compared to players with low resources
and the ability to obtain high payoffs.
In addition, study of the two variables simultaneously may yield
results that more closely approximate coalition behavior in the "real
world." Coalition situations for politicians, corporations, or family
members often include players with different resources and coalitions
that can obtain different payoffs. Thus, a concerted effort that bridges
game theoretic and social psychological approaches to coalition formation
holds promise not only for richer theory but also for more generalizable
results.
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TABLE 1
Five Characteristic Function Games Used in the North Carolina Studies
Game Value of Coalitions Quotas
v{AB) V (AC) v(BC)
A w^
I 95 90 65
II 115 90 85
III 95 88 81
IV 106 86 66
V 118 84 50
60 35 30
60 55 30
51 44 37
63 43 23
76 42 8







